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Abstract 
We calculate the return on the major Asian currency denominated long-term government 
bonds in terms of a basket of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) imports of goods and 
services, namely the real return on those assets from the PRC’s perspective. In the sample 
period of January 2002 to December 2009, the real return on United States (US) treasury 
bills is lower than that of Japan, India, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, or Thailand’s 
government bonds, and a little higher than that of Malaysia’s government bonds. This result 
shows that it is desirable for the PRC to substitute Asian currency denominated government 
bonds for US Treasury bills to maintain the purchasing power of its foreign exchange 
reserves. To some extent, this research supports the proposal by Fan, Wang, and Huang 
(2010) on the cross holding of regional currencies in foreign exchange reserves. 
JEL Classification: F31, F21, G11 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Global background 
The global financial crisis in 2008 reminded economists and policymakers once again that the 
existing United States (US) dollar dominated international monetary system has serious 
shortcomings. As noted in a report by the United Nations (UN) Commission (2009), “the global 
imbalances which played an important role in this crisis can only be addressed if there is a better 
way of dealing with international economic risks facing countries than the current system of 
accumulating international reserves.” 
To prevent disinflation, the US authorities adopt an extremely loose monetary policy and an 
excessively expansionary fiscal policy. The effects of those policies spill over to emerging 
economies that as a consequence are confronted with problems of inflation and asset price 
bubbles, rather than disinflation. Emerging economies, and even a developed economy like 
Japan, are forced to intervene in the foreign exchange markets or increase restrictions on 
international capital flows.  
In addition, loose monetary policy and excessively expansionary fiscal policy are threatening 
market confidence in the US dollar, and those policies may result in depreciation of the US dollar 
and inflation in future. For those economies holding large amounts of US securities in their foreign 
exchange reserves, a weak US dollar or inflation means a deterioration of the purchasing power 
of their foreign exchange reserves.  
Reforms of the global monetary system would help to solve global imbalances, reduce spillover 
from US economic policies, and maintain the value of foreign exchange assets held by emerging 
economies. The US dollar’s role as the major global reserve currency, especially its role as a 
medium of exchange and a unit of account, will not collapse in the near future. However, marginal 
changes in the global monetary system are needed. The key aim of marginal changes to the 
global monetary system would be to reduce demand for US dollar denominated assets, at least 
for those economies that continue to accumulate large amounts of their official foreign exchange 
reserves in the form of US dollar denominated assets. 
1.2  Regional background 
Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, academics and policymakers in Asia have advocated that 
Asian economies should strengthen financial and monetary cooperation in the region. Economists 
are in consensus about numerous aspects of such cooperation, such as short-term liquidity 
support, development of regional bond markets, regional exchange rate policy cooperation, and 
so on. The essential aim of such cooperation would be to reduce the over-dependence of the 
region on the US dollar, thereby improving regional financial stability and promoting regional trade 
and investment development (ASEAN+3 Research Group，2004). Up until now, the Chiang Mai 
Initiative, which is a network of bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) among ASEAN+3 countries
1 
aimed at addressing short-term liquidity difficulties in the region and supplementing existing 
international financial arrangements, has been the major achievement of ASEAN+3 financial 
cooperation.  
                                                  
1 The ASEAN+3 countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Viet Nam, the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 
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Despite calls by economists to promote Asian financial and monetary cooperation, real progress 
has remained limited in practice. Regional bond markets have developed slowly, exchange rate 
policy cooperation has made no progress at all, and even the usefulness of the Chiang Mai 
Initiative has been called into question. During the global financial crisis, the Republic of Korea 
was confronted with large swings in capital flows and a volatile exchange rate. When the Republic 
of Korea sought help from outside, it called on the US rather than utilizing swap agreements 
provided for by the Chiang Mai Initiative. It is understandable that the Republic of Korea made this 
choice. On the one hand, the credit conditionality of the swap agreements as part of the Chiang 
Mai Initiative is linked with International Monetatary Fund (IMF) credit conditionality, and is rather 
strict; on the other hand, publicly asking for liquidity support from the regional swap agreements 
may have weakened market confidence in the Republic of Korea’s economy.  
Given the limited progress in Asian financial and monetary cooperation, economists need to 
review the lessons of the past and come up with new suggestions that serve the interest of all 
countries in the region and that are more practical. Fan, Wang, and Huang (2010) propose that 
ASEAN+3 economies cross hold regional currencies as part of their Foreign Exchange Reserve. 
We think this would be attractive for ASEAN+3 economies and we will consider this proposal 
below.  
1.3  PRC background 
The monetary authority of the People’s Republic of China (henceforth, PRC) is confronted with big 
challenges in managing the PRC’s foreign exchange reserves. On the one hand, the US 
monetary authority continues with its loose monetary policy which may bring about further losses 
in the value of the PRC’s foreign exchange reserves in terms of purchasing power (Yu, 2010); on 
the other hand, the PRC is forced to increase its holdings of US dollar denominated assets since 
the PRC’s current account and financial account surplus will not disappear in the near future and 
the PRC’s monetary authority does not have sufficient alternative investment instruments. The 
PRC needs to reform the management of its foreign exchange reserves. The key element of such 
reform would be to reduce the share of US dollar denominated assets in the PRC’s foreign 
exchange reserves, thereby diversifying its foreign exchange reserve portfolio.  
1.4  Structure of this paper 
The key issue, which is an indispensable part of the needed reform of the global monetary 
system, East Asia regional financial and monetary cooperation, and protecting the real value of 
the PRC’s foreign exchange reserves, is how to reduce over-dependence on the US dollar. This is 
important for the PRC, the East Asian region, and the world. Without large incremental changes in 
foreign exchange reserves, the question that presents itself is what are the desirable substitutes 
for US dollar denominated assets? In this paper, we assess whether nominal and real returns on 
Asian currency denominated assets outperform those of US dollar denominated assets. Nominal 
returns on assets using the US dollar as a reference currency are easy to obtain and can be 
applied to all economies. However, nominal returns on assets using the US dollar as reference 
currency do not reflect purchasing power changes in those assets. Real returns on assets, which 
uses a basket of imported goods and services rather than the US dollar as reference unit, are 
preferable for measuring the changes in the real value of foreign exchange reserves.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces different concepts of 
returns on foreign exchange reserve assets, and shows how to calculate the real returns on 
assets. Chapter 3 gives our calculations of nominal and real returns on Asian currency 
denominated assets, and compares them with US dollar denominated assets. Chapter 4 
concludes. 
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2.  REAL RETURNS ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES 
2.1  Concept 
For the management of foreign exchange reserves it is of key importance to have a 
comprehensive and objective understanding of returns on foreign exchange reserves. In the 
process of calculating returns on foreign exchange reserves, the first problem is the selection of 
an appropriate reference currency or the unit of account. The choice of a reference currency is 
determined by the particular objectives aiming to be achieved by foreign exchange reserve 
management. Three choices appear in the literature as the most typical ones (Xu and Zhang, 
2010). The first is using the local currency as the reference currency, a choice that is justified if 
the central government’s objective is to maximize national wealth or domestic consumption 
(Dallas and Yoo, 1991; Beck and Rahbari, 2008). The second choice is using foreign currency as 
the reference currency, a choice to be made when the objective is to hold the reserves, for 
example to intervene in the foreign exchange market or to finance the capital account deficit. If 
such is the case, the unit of account should be the US dollar (Ben-Bassat, 1980), or a basket of 
currencies with their respective weights determined by an exchange rate peg target, or by the 
composition of imports (Rikkonen, 1989). The third choice is defining an appropriate currency 
index which is constructed based on the real purchasing power of a currency. As foreign 
exchange reserves are needed to be able to cope with possible future current account deficits, the 
composite index is usually constructed based on the proportion of total imports from different 
countries or the proportion of payment in currencies used to import, and deflated by foreign price 
indices. See Kouri and de Macedo (1978), Ben-Bassat (1980), Healy (1981), Ben-Bassat (1984), 
Horii (1986), and Dellas (1989) for more details.  
In practice, the US dollar is widely used as the reference currency, not only because it is the most 
liquid and widely accepted in international accounting and payments, but also because it is able to 
meet the needs of central banks to intervene in foreign exchange markets or to finance their 
capital accounts. Another important motivation lies in the fact that it offers a yardstick for 
assessing the relative performances of central banks as institutional investors, since employing 
the dollar as the unit of account is highly accepted amongst global institutional investors. 
Based on a comprehensive literature review of both theoretical and empirical studies, Roger 
(1993) identified three motives for the holding of foreign exchange reserves by central banks: (1) 
transactions needs, namely to finance readily foreseeable foreign exchange demands of either 
the public or the private sector; (2) intervention needs, namely for the purpose of foreign 
exchange market intervention and meeting macroeconomic policy targets, which is considered to 
be the most important source of demand for reserves; (3) wealth diversification or portfolio 
considerations, namely for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing the value of foreign exchange 
reserves. Since the PRC’s current foreign exchange reserves are much larger than necessary to 
meet regular reserve demands for debt repayment, current account deficit payments, and 
intervening in the foreign exchange market to stabilize yuan exchanges, maintaining their long-
term value and realizing high investment yields in real purchasing power terms have become the 
primary targets
2 of the PRC’s foreign exchange reserve management.  
                                                  
2 Based on a survey conducted by the authors in 2009, most experts in the PRC Finance 40 Forum think that the most 
prominent problem of foreign exchange reserve management at present is to maintain and increase its long-term value. 
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Given the PRC’s prime objective is to increase the value of its foreign exchange reserves in real 
purchasing power terms, the PRC should assess the desirability of the assets based on real 
return rather than nominal return. Taking the PRC as an example, if the US dollar depreciates 
against other reserve currencies, the overall nominal value of foreign exchange reserves in US 
dollar terms will increase, whereas the real purchasing power of foreign exchange reserves will 
decrease. It is obvious that there is a sharp contrast between the increase of nominal returns of 
foreign exchange reserve assets in US dollar terms and a decrease of real returns in purchasing 
power terms. If returns in US dollar terms is chosen as the operating target in foreign exchange 
reserve management, the results may be a lower ability to meet international payments, a 
reduced capacity for foreign exchange market intervention, and a loss of national wealth. This 
would go against the aforementioned three original motivations for holding foreign exchange 
reserves, especially against the major motivation, which is to maintain and increase the real value 
of foreign exchange reserves.  
2.2  Return on foreign exchange reserve assets in terms of a basket of 
imported goods and services 
We construct the return on foreign exchange reserve assets in terms of a basket of imported 
goods and services, namely the real return on foreign exchange reserve assets (Real Return on 
Foreign Exchange Reserve, RRFER). This measure reflects the purchasing power changes of the 
foreign exchange assets. 
The formula of RRFER is: 
                                             （1） 
In which，”i” represents the nominal return on the asset in local currency terms; “reer” represents 
the local currency’s purchasing power of a basket of goods and services; we call it the real 
effective exchange rate (reer) of the currency.  
The construction of the “reer” formula is as follows: 
∑ = =
20
1 / i x i i x RE reer θ            （2） 







/ = . The price indices, P, used here are 
fixed-base export price indices from the corresponding trade partners or the producer price 
indices if export price indices are not available. 
θ  represents the weight of each currency. Currency weight can be chosen according to research 
objectives. In this study, the weight of an individual currency is determined by its weight in the 
PRC’s imports. The aim of employing this method is to assess the relative importance of a 
currency from the perspective of the purchasing power of a basket of the PRC’s imported goods 
and services. As we mentioned, the primary current objective of foreign exchange reserve 
management for the PRC is to maintain and enhance the real value of the foreign exchange 
reserves, namely to maintain their purchasing power in terms of imported goods and services. In 
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this study the PRC’s twenty largest importing countries
3 are considered and their weights are 
readjusted to make the readjusted sum equal to 1.  
   represents the real effective exchange rate of a currency x in terms of a basket of imported 
goods and services. Taking   as an example, an increase in   indicates a one unit US 
dollar increase in purchasing power of a basket of the PRC’s import goods and services. There 
are two important differences between the “ ” used here and the “ ” generally referred 
to. The first is that the weights of various currencies in the basket for the former are determined by 
the PRC’s import structure, while those of the latter depend on the foreign trade structure of the 
US. The second is that the “ ” generally referred to represents the relative price changes of 
a basket of US goods and services relative to a basket of goods of trade partners, while the 
 defined here reflects the relative price changes of one unit of US dollar relative to a basket 
of goods and services. We do not adjust the exchange rate for US prices levels, but for the price 
levels of the PRC’s trading partners.  
x reer
US x = US reer
US reer US reer
US reer
US reer
3.  NOMINAL AND REAL RETURNS ON MAJOR ASIAN 
CURRENCY DENOMINATED ASSETS 
3.1  Nominal returns on major Asian currency denominated assets 
Official foreign exchange reserves have high requirements in terms of safety and liquidity, and the 
lion’s share of them are invested in government bonds and agency bonds. Due to data 
constraints, we only consider the return on long term government bonds—an easily accepted 
choice for foreign exchange reserve asset managers. We only consider several major Asian 
economies, such as Japan, India, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore—all 
of them included in the list of the PRC’s twenty largest import countries. In addition, we include 
Australia in our research. Our research period is from January 2001 to December 2009. 
In figure 1, the average yield on long-term US treasury bills is 4.46%; the average yield on 
government bonds for India, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand in term of their local currencies 
are higher than that of US treasury bills, and the standard error of those bonds are higher than 
that of US treasury bills too. The average yields on government bonds for Japan, Malaysia, and 
Singapore in terms of their local currencies are lower than that on US treasury bills, and the 
standard error of those bonds are lower than that of US treasury bills too. The average yield on 
Australian government bonds in term of local currency is higher than that of US treasury bills, and 
the standard error of Australian government bonds is lower than that of US treasury bills. 
 
                                                  
3 The PRC’s trading partners in decreasing order of weights are the US; Japan; the European Union (EU); Hong Kong, 
China; Taipei,China; the Republic of Korea; Thailand; Malaysia; Singapore; Indonesia; India; Canada; Brazil; Russia; 
South Africa; the United Kingdom; Australia; Saudi Arabia; Iran; and Argentina.  
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Figure 1: Yield on Long-Term Government Bonds in Local Currency Terms (%) 
 
Note: US, INR, KR, MY, SG, TH, JP, AU denote US, India, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Japan, and 
Australia, respectively.  
Data Source: CEIC 
The result could be very different if we substituted the US dollar for local currencies as the 
reference currency. In figure 2, the average yields on government bonds for major Asian 
economies except for Japan in US dollar terms are higher than that of US Treasury bills, and the 
standard error of those bonds are higher than that of US treasury bills too. The average yield on 
Australian government bonds in US dollar terms is higher than that of US Treasury bills, and the 
standard error of Australian government bonds is lower than that of US Treasury bills. 
Figure 2: Yield on Long-Term Government Bonds in US Dollar Terms (%) 
 
Note: US, INR, KR, MY, SG, TH, JP, AU denote US, India, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Japan, and 
Australia, respectively. 
Source: CEIC and author’s calculation  
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3.2  The purchasing power of major Asian currencies in terms of the 
PRC’s imported goods and services  
To obtain the real return on different foreign exchange reserve assets, we need (1) the nominal 
return on assets in local currencies, which is illustrated in figure 1; and (2) the change in 
purchasing power of the PRC’s imported goods and services for each local currency, namely the 
real effective exchange rate for each local currency. The latter is constructed based on formula 
(2).  
In figure 3, major Asian currencies’ purchasing power in terms of the PRC’s imports of goods and 
services declined in that each currency’s appreciation against the PRC’s major trade partners is 
less than the weighted average inflation of those trading partners. From January 2001 to 
December 2009, each unit of Indian rupee, Korean won, Malaysian ringgit, Singapore dollar, 
Thailand baht, and Japanese yen’s purchasing power in terms of the PRC’s imports of goods and 
services basket declined by 35%，30%，27%，12%, 9%, and 11%, respectively. In the same 
period, one unit of US dollar’s purchasing power in terms of the PRC’s imports of goods and 
services basket declined by 21%. One unit of Australian dollar’s purchasing power in terms of the 
PRC’s imports of goods and services basket increased by 6%. 
Figure 3: Purchasing Power Changes in Terms of the PRC’s Imports of Goods and 
Services Basket for One Unit of Currency (%) 
 
Note: US, INR, KR, MY, SG, TH, JP, AU denote US, India, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Japan, and 
Australia, respectively. 
Source: CEIC and author’s calculation  
3.3  The real return on Asian assets  
Combining nominal return and each currency’s purchasing power change in terms of the PRC’s 
imports of goods and services basket, we obtained the real return on each asset. As shown in 
Figure 4, over the period of January 2002 to December 2009, the average real return on long-
term government bills of India, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Japan 
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was 1.55%, 0.31%, -0.58%, 1.26%, 3.44%, and 0.45%, respectively. The average real return on 
long-term US Treasury bills over the same period is -0.06%. The average real return on long term 
Australian government bonds in the same period is 5.65%. The real return on long-term 
government bills of India, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Japan, and Australia was more volatile 
than that of US Treasury bills. The real return on long term government bills of Singapore and 
Malaysia was less volatile than that of US Treasury bills. This result shows that the average real 
return on long-term US Treasury bills is poor, underperforming long-term government bonds in all 
major Asian economies, except Malaysia. 
Figure 4: Real Returns on Asian Long Term Government Bonds, US Treasury Bills, and 
Australian Government Bonds 
 
Note: US, INR, KR, MY, SG, TH, JP, AU denote US, India, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Japan, and 
Australia, respectively. 
Source: CEIC and author’s calculation  
4.  CONCLUSION 
Reducing the over-dependence on the US dollar is needed for the reform of the global monetary 
system, East Asian regional financial and monetary cooperation, and maintaining the real value of 
the PRC’s foreign exchange reserves. To reduce the over-dependence on the US dollar, we need 
to know the desirable substitutes for US dollar denominated assets. In this paper, we calculated 
the return on major Asian currency denominated government bonds in term of a basket of the 
PRC’s imports of goods and services, namely the real return on those assets from the PRC’s 
perspective. In the period of January 2002 to December 2009, the real return on US treasury bills 
is lower than that of Japan, India, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Thailand’s government 
bonds, and a little bit higher than that of Malaysia’s government bonds. This result shows that it is 
desirable for the PRC to substitute Asian currency denominated government bonds and 
Australian government bonds for US Treasury bills to maintain the purchasing power of its foreign 
exchange reserves. 
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